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HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA
Yash Ghai*
THE INTERNATIONAL

CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

The history of human rights is ancient but its contemporary salience can be
traced to the establishment
of the United Nations and the proclamation by its
General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Since
then, the UN and related agencies have concluded a number of Conventions to
implement the provisions of the Universal Declaration by elaborating detailed
formulations
of specific rights and establishing
some machinery
for their
supervision. Much of this work was done in commillees of officials and did not,
for the most part, attract much public attention.
There were undoubtedly
differences among groups of countries on the scope of particular rights, the
priorities among them, and the extent of their enforceability. These were resolved
within the committees and did not engage great public interest (even in the
highly controversial instance of the right to development). Ilowever, in the last
few years, questions of human rights have achieved a high salience. This is
attributable to the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe, which removed
the cold war agenda and introduced space for discussions on liberty and freedom.
The West took the opportunity
to develop another agenda centering around
human rights and democracy. This interest coincided with the growth of highly
visible international
NGOs which assumed a major responsibility for the scrutiny
of the record of individual countries on human rights. The link of human rights
to democracy was established through the work of international
aid agencies,
particularly the World Bank and the USAIIl: which made "governance" a central
feature of their development assistance. Cood governance was largely equated
with democratic institutions and practices (including transparency).
The

result

implications

of the approach

of the West was to bring

out

clearly

the

of the human rights work steadily (and indeed some times obscurely,

as with the Convention on the Rights of Migrants) developed through the UN
and its agencies. It brought to the fore the responsibility of the international
community for the protection of human rights everywhere, and thereby highlighted
the ways in which national sovereignty has been qualified by the UN Charter and
the human rights conventions. Relations between a state and its nationals were
no longer a matter merely for that State; some fundamental
norms of that
relationship
were now defined in the international
community as also to its
sanctions. International
relations
themselves are increasingly mediated through
human rights discourse and practice. Aid conditionalities,
unthinkable a decade
ago, have become common place. The legitimacy 'Of international
involvement
Professor
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by discussions

at a conference

and held in Manila

in 1994.)

on

was heightened not only by the moral authority of human rights and the collapse
of political regimes associated in many minds with their denial, but also by the
willingness of several countries to accept international assistance for establishing
human rights and democracy (Eastern Europe, Hussia, Nepal, Cambodia, South
Africa, etc) and considerable public support in many countries for such intervention
in their own case. Further, ~upport for the emphasis on human rights and good
governance was secured through arguments about their link to sustained economic
and social development.
However, not all governments have taken kindly to the internationalisation
of human rights and uemocracy. Many governments
are unable to carry their
opposition to it to international fora because of their fragile political and economic
systems and the dependence
on external· donors. Several Asian countries,
particularly in south east and east Asia, have offered a spirited rebuttal of this
internationalisation
(in much of this paper I talk of "Asian governments",
so it is
as well to make a disclaimer that not all Asian governments
subscribe to the
views attributed to some of them, but these are the more vocal and in regional
meetings are able to muster a show of solidarity on the basis of their own
ground, as demonstrated
in the pre-Vienna conference meeting in Bangkok).
They resent the inposition of the international community (and particularly the
hegemony of particular countries within it) in their relations with their citizens.
They also resent the leverage it has given these other countries (and international
institutions)
over their policies, and see the new approach
as attempts to
undermine their moral authority, disrupt their political stability, and retard their
economic progress. I<ather than as in some other regions, withdraw from the
debate, they have sought to provide an alternative
of human rights and democracy.

framework

for the discourse

Secure in the economic success of their policies which owe little to democracy
or human rights, they contest the claims of the positive links between democracy
(and human rights) and economic development. Indeed they argue that a measure
of tight political control to ensure political stability is necessary for economic
development in the kinds of society they have. The basis of political authority in
Asia is rooted in concepts and practices different from those in the West. Another
plank in their argument is that most of the rights which the West is purveying
are "western" in origin, orienteu towarus an inuividualistic society and therefore
inappropriate
to Asia where the values of communal action are highly prized.
Furthermore,
the priorities as between different human rights vary from country
to country, and certainly in their own States. the priority must be given to
economic and social rights, which call for collective rights and government
initiatives. In this way they dispute "western" notions of the universality and
indivisibility of human rights. On a more doctrinal but basic level, they challenge
the legitimacy of international involvement in human rights and national political
systems on the argument that the fundamental principle of international law and
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relations

is state sovereignty

The politicisalion of
raises acute questiol15 of
action on human rights?
What abuses are inherent

(to which belong these questions).

human rights that has followed their internationalisation
theory and practice. What is the basis for international
What justifies political and economic conditionalities?
in conditionalities?
How does one check these abuses,

particularly
those of "double standards" and "double speak"? Why should a
State's competence tp deal with its citizens be circumscribed
by reference to
human rights or governance ? At the heart of this debate lies the nature of
human rights anc. the source of their authority. Are human rights determined by
the culture or eco.10mic development of a country, contingent on history, or do
they represent
universal values true for all time and places? Stemming from
considerations
of theory and strategies, are some rights more basic than others?
Is there a sequence in the development and achievement of human rights? How
are human right:, and democracy linked to economic and social development?
These are in fact extraordinarily
hard questions, to which political theory does
not provide ready .'nswers. Yet some resolution of these questions is essential to
place current international
debates within a more rational, objective and agreed
framework. The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights failed to resolve
these issues, despite a· "consensus" document.

THE NA TURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
There is a broad agreement that a key purpose of society is to ensure the
dignity of the human person. For many people, human dignity is to be secured
through the protection of human rights. Oth~rs have different views on how to
achieve this aim but all would concede some role for human rights. However,
there is no gener~! agreement on the nature of human rights. The conception of
the basis of human rights has varied from time to time, and from place to place.
For a long time in the West, the belief that rights were derived from a divine
ordering held sway, but it gradually gave way to the notion that rights originated
from and were a response to the very nature of man. In that sense they are
inherent and inali'::'1abk This secularisatiol1 of the source of human rights arose
under certain s(' 'ial and economic systems and consequently
to emphasise
individualism.
In one way, it could be argued that basing human rights on the
nature of man (and these days we must concede, woman) should lay the
foundations
for a universal
regime. Unfortunately,
this has not ~en
the
consequence
for a variety of reasons, it would seem. First the "man" of the
market system is acculturated in its peculiar values and dynamics, "disembedded"
from the community. In societies where the dominance of the market over
culture and community has not taken place, this view of human rights does not
command universal accf:ptance. Similarly where the sway of religion is strong,
the secular basis of hu,11an rights affects their acceptability, for which they must
draw from the orientation
of a particular religion. Since it is claimed that
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community (and its culture)
organised in Asia, a purchase

and religion are essential to the way society is
on some theoretical and practical questions posed

above can be secured through an eXlImination of their relationship
to human
rights. That should also help us to discover if there is a distinct Asian view of
human rights.

Religion
While some commentators
have argued that religion provides the basis for
a conception of universal regime of rights since all religions have the same
fundamental values, others maintain that religious values vary and thus negate
the concept of a ulliversal regime. An immediate difficulty facing an exploration
of the question whether a distinctive Asian perspective on human rights emerges
from the religion of its people is that there are numerous religions in Asia,
including all the world's major ones. Assuming that religion does indeed influence
a people's perception of human rights, then one would have to concede that
there would be a plurality of perspectives, not one. Even if we concede that for
our enquiry what matters are "Asian" religions (Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism
plus the influential set of beliefs represented
by Confucianism), as reflecting
more accurately Asian pre-dispositions, they too vary in their beliefs and values.
Nor does the same religion manifest itself uniformly in its discourse about
human rights at all times and in all countries. Buddhism is militant and aggressive
in Sri Lanka, asserting ethnic and religious superiority of one section of the
population, while elsewhere, as in Cambodia, it has been a force for peace and
the protection of the rights of all communities.
Hinduism was once seen as
tolerant and non-proselytising,
providing a constitutional
basis for secularism in
India; today many of its adherents are militant and attack beliefs and institutions
of other religions. The Hinduism of Nepal is more syncretized than of modern
India, able to co-exist and even assimilate with other religions. In many east
Asian countries,

all religions

and values, ~etracting
In many places

seem to be mediated

through

Confucian

thought

from the specificity of the religion.
religion

takes its coloration

from politics, woven into the

apparatus of the States or claiming a special eminence in the affairs of the State.
While western States separated State and religion (whatever the influence of
religion on human rights), the contemporary
tendency in many parts of Asia
(particularly South Asia) is to connect religion with State. In some instances this
has served to diminish the scope for human rights. Sometimes religion acts as a
conservative force, at other times it is a major factor for change (and the same
religion can play these opposite roles if we compare Christianity in Latin America
with that in Europe).
Religions
can also lend themselves
to, alternative
interpretations.
Texts of most religions
can be
moved for contradictory
propositions. In the circumstances, is it best to separate the discourse of human
rights from religion? One answer is no, on the assumption
that since Asian
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people rely on religion for spiritual sustenance and some times political authority,
rights should be anchored in religion. This is also a way to counter the argument
that human rights are foreign constructs by providing an autochthonous
base
for them in Asia beliefs and values.
mixing of texts is justified.

Therefore,

it is argued,

that

a selective

The question remains, however, whether religions can provide a basis for a
universal regime. It is some times said that all religions are animated by the
same concerns and values. Unfortunately
this statement does not hold, since
different values are emhrined
in different religions. Some like Hinduism have
sanctified social an j caste distinc'tions, and others like Confucianism, established
a social and political hierarchy. Nor is equality the hall mark of Islam, for despite
its ideals, its practices cleaved to a trihal and unequal society of its origin.
Christianity justified slavery for centuries, and Christian based western political
systems did not accommodate
the equal rights of blacks and women until this
century. Not all ilsian States (including the largcst of them) cncourage
the
holding or the ey,ercise of religious beliefs (preferring to base their source of
rights in popular sovereignty). Heligions would not appear therefore to hold the
key to universalism.
Indeed most religions in some sense deny the claims of
equality: traditionally Hindus found people of other religions polluting, and most
other religions have;} notion of the "non-belicver" to whom an inferior status is
accorded in both relil~ious and secular systems. Nor docs religion provide a basis
for arguing that there is a distinctive Asian perspective on human rights.

Culture
If an interest in religion is motivated by the wish to find common roots for
human rights, culture is explored to explain diversity and specificity. As noted
above, some Asian governments claim that their societies place a higher value on
the community
than in the west, that individuals
find fulfillment in their
participation

in communal

life and community tasks, and that this factor constitutes

a primary distinction in the approach to human rights. The western pre-occupation
with individualislll is explained by the alienation resulting from it:; economic
system which has sapped the vitality of the community, and forced introspection
on individuals as
means towards their identity. This argument is advanced as
an instance of the general proposition that rights are culture specific.
As with religion,

culture

does not provide

a basis for a cOl11mon Asian

perspective,
since its cultures are varied (negating the claim of some Asian
governments
that there is a distinctive Asian culture/community
which is
juxtaposed to the individualistic and materialistic culture of the west). Secondly
as with religion, culture is subject to change, and in Asia it has changed under
the influence of national and global markets, western systems of education and
government. These the:nselves have had an unequal influence in different parts
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of Asia, both reducing and sharpening
previous differences of culture. The
principal argument is that Asian cultures based on the primacy of the community,
emphasise duties rather than rights, and that the ultimate test of an act or policy
is the good of the community and not specific individuals. Whether it is so easy
to distinguish the interests of the community from the individual is problematic.
The emphasis on the community in multi-cultural
and multi-ethnic societies
(which characterise
most Asian states) tends towards the dominance of one
culture over others, and so leads to politics of control, if not repression - Asia is
rich in instances of these situations. In these circumstances
the community is
divisive and destabilising, the exact opposite of the claims invoked in its name.
The challenge of nation-building (another favourite argument for a lower salience
of human rights) is thus the transcending and not the entrenchment
of cultural
divides. Even in relatively homogenous states, like Nepal, the community can be
the repository of harsh practices and gross discrimination,
and its reform can
become a constitutional
imperative (as indeed it has been so mandated in India
and Nepal). There is the further theoretical problem in that in the modern Asian
official discourse, the community is conflicted with the State, with the result that
the rights but not the obligations of the community are transferred
to the
government.
The relationship
between the individual and the "community"
is
thus totally distorted.
Thoughtful
Asians, who concede many of the above criticisms
of a
"communitarian"
approach, nevertheless hold on to some important distinctions
between the West and Asia, which they consider are rooted in culture. This is
first the distinction between duties and rights. An aspect of this is the tendency
in the West towards formalism, the formulation of values in terms of legal rights,
and the consequent emphasis on the rights and prerogatives of an individual.
Based on a theory of competition
and suspicion of authority,
this leads to
demands rather than concessions, to confrontation
rather than accommodation
and harmony. An emphasis on duties on the other hand leads to honour and
peace, as well as stability (because also to obedience). It is argued that the rights
based emphasis leads to the impoverishment
of society, so that in the search for
the protection of the citizen against the State, the community collapses and nonstate actors become the principal source of oppression and insecurity (making it
unsafe to be on the streets of major metropolises after sunset). There is also the
danger in formalisation of values as "rights" that the form may elude substance
(so that the satisfaction of formal criteria hides realities that deny the values, as
Professor Mazrui once said, the west may have abolished child marriages, but
the number of teenage
However,

pregnancies

and one parent families has vastly increased.

in the hands of an intolerant

government,

the concept

of duties

can become a justification as well as an instrument of authoritarianism.
This is
perhaps not inherent in the notion of duties, but duties are also laid upon rules
(in the best Islamic and Confucian traditions), and indeed the notion of duty can
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be truly revolutionary. In practice, however this is not often how it is, duties vary
from person to person (persons at the top of the hierarchy having rights and
those at the lower reaches, duties, frequently betokening social, economic or
political subordination,
tends towards conservatism
and the perpetuation
of
inequalities
antithetical
to the claims of equitable development
advanced by
many Asian governments.
Furthermore
the conflation between the State and
community serves to strengthen the tentacles of the government over society. It
is also the case that the notion of duties transferred from the community to the
State changes its nature from inter-citizen obligations and responsibilities
to the
much more problematic case of state-citizen relations. Nothing is more destructive
of the community than this conflation. The community and the state are different
institutions, to some extent in a contrary juxtaposition.
The community, for the
most part, depends on popular norms developed by consensus and enforced
through mediation and persuasion. The State is an imposition on society, and
unless humanised and democratised (as it has not been in most of Asia), it relies
on edicts, the military, coercion and sanctions. It is the tension between them
which has underpinned
and sustained human rights. The West has to some
extent separated civil society from the State, creating a "neutral" public area and
space for communities
(from which of course the commanding heights of the
State may be controlled), while in Asia the tendency is towards the convergence
of the two, regarded perhaps as necessary for the legitimacy of the State but
ultimately destructive of the community.
Another

distinction

that is seen to flow from cultural

differences

is the role

of the family. It is frequently said that the bedrock of Asian societies is the
family, and it has become fashionable to ascribe social problems in the west to
the breakdown of family life. It is claimed for Asia that mutual responsibilities
within the family provide for the welfare of its members, ensure traditions of
respect and rectitude, and promote social stability and economic development.
The conversion of values into individual rights undermines the basis of family
solidarity. However, countries which are not known for their practice of individual
rights have found that the family may well be weakening under the pressure of
other social and economic changes. A particular irony is that a legislator in
Singapore, known to enjoy government support, recently introduced a bill to
give parents the right to sue their children for maintenance
(and the children
the defence that the parents mistreated them when they were young!). It is hard
to imagine that such a bill would achieve its objective of maintaining
family
solidarity!
The
ways. At
therefore
relativity.
there are

concern with the erosion of family values is instructive in a number of
one level it minimises the Asian claim for cultural distinctiveness,
and
relativity of rights. At another level it provides another basis for
Societies are constantly changing, and with economic and social changes,
also changes in the perception of what is important and valuable to a
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community or a group. In other words, an assessment of the priorities in human
rights alters with the underlying economic transformations. The west too has
had .its "communitarian" phase (and the community is still important there), and
the family is still cherished, even if old solidarities are beginning to dissolve
under economic pressures. Asian governments, which cheerfully and sometimes
aggressively espouse" western" notion of development and the market, find that
they can no longer ward off its child, 'human rights'.
The above analysis suggests that a useful perspective on human rights is
drawn from hisLry: the (dialectical) unfolding of rights, representing social
achievements, etc. 'l'his in turn suggests that the development and understandings
of rights are contingent on a variety of factors, moral ideas as well as material
conditions, and that differences in their perception are attributable to them than
to any inherent iJeas of culture, community, etc. This approach does indeed
provide a basis f0" reconciling so called "western" and "eastern" perceptions of
human rights. In my view this provides a better basis for global debates on this
subject. The notiu that distinct "Western" and "Asian" perspectives exist is
inaccurate, ahistorical, and leads to unfruitful polarities (ignoring for example
that the west also has a notion of duty limitations on rights/freedoms). Equally
it distorts the debates on human rights, by suggesting that the key conflict is
between the east and the west, rather than that it is within each. It detracts from
the relevance and urgency of human rights discourse in Asia, the keen debates
on the appropriate models for representation, governance and accountability,
and equity. Asian intellectuals and activists need to rescue the debate from the
present sterile phase to place it at the centre of national and regional politics.
If the perception and practice of rights are related to the socio-economic
conditions of the period, this means often no more than that it is the interests of
the dominant" groups which are represented as the primary rights. Yet there is a
certain dialectical quality about human rights. While it is the interests of the
establishment which receive the clearest representation as rights (e. 'g., the
relative neglect of economic and social rights, other than property, in the US
and Japan), it is the delfiands of the disadvantaged seeking recognition as rights
which provide the moral imperative to the discourse of rights. Thus rights can
be both conservative and revolutionary.
Even if we were to concede that Asian cultures or religions are distinctive
and that these colour the perception and reality of rights, it is not clear why the
global debate has taken the opposition of political and civil rights ("Western")
versus economic and social rights ("Asian"). Why should the communitarian
approach suggest that economic and social rights are more important than
political? It may be argued that traditionally communities were hierarchically
organised and that its cohesion depended on duties (although as we have seen
duties and rights are regarded as different routes to the same goal, the dignity of
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man and woman). But the communities
were even less concerned
with
"development"
which is undoubtedly
more of a foreign concept than fair or
accountable
administration
or harmony within the community. If human rights
do not follow from Asian cultures. then no more docs economic development.
The same can be said of "Asian" rcligiollS. which are stereotyped
as other
worldly ( like most religions), more concerlled with salvation in the next world
than economic prosperity in this. Ethics arc more important than power, and
asceticism and austerity are values approved by most of these religions. Apart
from the somewhat ambiguous position of Confucianism {which is mistakenly
today regarded as development oriented rather than as preserving the status quo
as traditionally regarded}. there is litlle in "Asian" religions to support a privileged
position for economic development.
It is interesting that the most influential
Christian church in Asia is Catholicism rather that the Weberian, development
driven Calvinism or a variant of it! Asian goverllments are therefore on shaky
ground when they invoke tradition to justify the primacy of development.
If
economic rights are seen to flow from "communal" or "collective rights", there is
a misapprehension
for these rights arc normally attributed
with "solidarity"
rights to a clean environment,
property uS commOll, and a measure of equity,
which are anathema to at least some Asian prime ministers).
If there is no substantial basis in community, culture or religion for economic
and social rights, then why do Asian goverllments place such rhetorical emphasis
on them? They sometimes say that civil and political rights are meaningless if
the people are poor and illiterate. There is of course considerable truth in this,
but there is reason to be sceptical about the sincerity of the governments
for
they have done little to establish economic rights or promote civil rights in
countries
which have achieved greut economic success. The more plausible
reason is that the talk of economic and social rights is diversionary, an attack on
civil and political rights. Goverllments are anxious to minimise challenges to
their authority or legitimacy, which means (as it seems to them) the suppression
or emasculation
of political opposition. A preference for eCOllomic rights might
also arise from the consideration
that it is much harder to hold governments
accountable for them. They are for the most part matters more of standards than
precise rules and entitlements.
their enforceability is problematic and they are
widely regarded as contingent Oll resources. In fact these goverllments dislike
talk of economic and social rights, except when engaged in global debates (many
of them do not like talk of any rights), I.t is not easy to establish how civil and
political rights threaten economic and social rights. The juxtaposition
these
governments
play upon domestically is not between these different rights, but
between civil and political rights and economic development.
It is economic
development,
not economic rights, that they emphasise. They are, however,
content to seek economic rights of states, the so-called developing states (as in
their advocacy of the 'right to development').
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As compared to thc proposition
that civil and political ri~hts damage
prospects
of economic rights. some of these governments
have developed
sophisticated arguments against civil and political rights hased on the imperative
of economic development. Brieny these are that economic development requires
stable political conditions. It is then argued (or implied) that political and civil
rights threatcn
political stahility. particularly
in a young country without
established nationalism. Some authoritarian
powers are necessary to ensurc law
and order. and to control ethnic tcnsions. Implied in this is also a riposte to
western governments
which argue that economic development is facilitated by
democracy and political freedoms - an issue which is examined helow under
governance.
The globalisation
of till' debate on ri~hts and the
governments
therein raise several issucs, three of which will
These arc the question of conditionalities;
the relationship
political rights on the one hand and economic and social on
connection between democracy and economic dcvclopment.

position
be taken
between
the other;

of Asian
up here.
civil and
and the

Conditionalitics
Ilow far should (in this instance) wcstcrn countries specify political conditions
(relating to dcmocracy or human rights) on their aid or economic relations with
other
(in this instance)
Asian countries?
What is the justification
for
conditionalities?
How effective are they? Tile justification ~ocs to the nature of
the responsibilities
of the intcmational
community for human ri~hts. and here
we have a confrontation hctwecn thosc who argue that contemporary international
law has brought human rights within the jurisdiction
of the international
community and those (which includes most Asian states) that they remain securely
within national sovereignty.
From thcse perspectivcs,
one difficulty is that
conditionalities
are rarely imposed by the international
community. They are
imposed by a state or an association of like minded states. \·vhich clearly affects
their legitimacy. As national or rc~ional initiatives they do not of course require
to be justified by a rule of intemationallaw
on human rights; thcy are within the
sovereignty of the donor/trading
state.
Conditionalities, however. raise other kinds of prohlems. There is the danger
of "doublc standars" in a dual sense; the standards or human rights practices of
the "donor" may be little beller that that of the recipient. and the donor may
pick and choose States for condition,alities, further politicising the practice of
conditionality,
Conditionality may threaten consistency in another sense; a state
may decide that its national intcrests no longer lie in maintainin~ conditionality,
and may abandon it after havin~ initiated it (as with the recent US decision on
MFN status for China). An important casualty of this change may well he human
rights activists in the "recipient" country who !lave staked a great deal (personally
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and otherwise) on continued support from abroad. Conditionality can also back
fire if the local government decides to whip up anti-foreign sentiments on its
basis as it may frequently suit its- purposes. Conditionalities of the 'structural
adjustment' kind are contradictory, denying the premise of democratic decision
making. They engage the state and civil society institutions in a human rights
dialogue with the donors, rather than with their own people. They may also
sharpen polarities which are unlikely to be productive. It is also the case that
smaller and weaker countries are more likely to be subjected to conditionalities
(although the US policies in China and recently in Indonesia suggests that this is
not universally true). Dialogue is clearly better than conditions.
Conditionalities may also cause offence because they imply a notion of
universal regime of human rights, not accommodating cultural or other relativities
(for otherwise there would be no justification on the part of the "donor" in
imposing them other than narrow self-interest). To those who believe in relativities,
this may seem merely as another form of cultural imperialism. They have also
been seen as economic imperialism, for they have frequently embodied
requirements of privatisation and deregulation and the general strengthening of
the market mechanism, generally under the rubric of good governance. The
relationship of these requirements to human rights is controversial. Conditionalities
therefore raise several issues controversial in the d~bates on human rights, and
will themselves remain a matter of contention unless there is a greater consensus
on these issues.
POLITICAL

AND CIVIL RIGHTS VERSUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

The controversy over the priority of these two types of rights is not new.
Representing a clash between "liberalism" and "marxism", it dominated the
drafting of the International Bill of Rights, and resulted in a bifurcation of rights
into two covenants (one concentrating on civil and political rights, the ICCPR,
and the other on economic, social and cultural, the ICESCR). The ideological
context of the controversy has, however, changed. By and large the market
provides the matrix for the proponents on both sides. For example while the
Soviet Union was firmly opposed to the right to property (which does not feature
in the Covenants), Asian governments (including China now) are wedded to it.
The difference between the two sides lies in the vision of the market. In western
theory the market is autonomous, and the safeguarding of that autonomy requires
a number of civil and political rights (property, freedom of movement, association
and organisation, expression, an independent and rational legal order, etc). The
control of the State, which provides the legal am! administrative framework for
the market, comes from an earlier dominance in civil society (emphasising yet
again the importance of civil rights). Asian markets are organised in a much
more authoritarian and rapacious manner; there is wide scale corruption; the
State is a means to control over economic resources and civil society; and many

75

are still at the "primitive accumulation" stage. Administration is more important
that the law; and the imperatives of control override those of economic autonomy.
Ideological justifications for the success of the markets in Asia, harping upon the
Confucian values of authority, obedience and the salience of the family in economic
affairs, are used not to establish the irrelevance of civil and political rights but
their destructive qualities. Economic rights get short shrift too, as in the current
attitudes of some Asian governments to the rights of workers or the protection
of the environment (which are seen, perhaps not without justification, as attempts
by the west to reduce the competitiveness of Asian economies, but which
nevertheless point to the shallowness of the commitment of many governments
to economic rights). It is therefore unlikely that we shall get useful purchase on
the question of 'economic and social v. political and civil rights' by examining
the stance of Asian governments.
What then might be other approaches to the question? One is to move
away from the polarities of civil and political rights on the one hand and social
and economic on the other. Each has a bundle of rights which vary in their
impact on the State and citizens and not all are individually oriented. Their
disaggregation and the purpose each serves may suggest different and more
productive categorisations. Another is to insist on their equal importance and
indeed indivisibility. Since one's perception of rights is governed by the state of
one's belly, it could be argued that a certain level of literacy and economic
security are essential for the exercise and enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Equally, economic prosperity and high literacy without the freedom of expression
or the right of association fail to develop the full potential of the human person,
and the denial of these rights can be humiliating and degrading (this position is
increasingly being taken in recent international instruments on the rights of
special groups - women, children and indigenous peoples, which have broken
away from the bifurcation of the Covenants, being based on the understanding
that real equality for women or indigenous people or the real protection of
children's rights cannot be secured without major social transformation in their
social and economic conditions). A variation of this position is to acknowledge
that both sets of rights are important and even that they are indivisible, but to
concede that it may not be possible to achieve them all at once (that reform of
the legal system to ensure civil rights of fair and speedy trial for example can be
as expensive as providing water supply to rural areas). This stance raises the
question of the instrumentality and sequencing of rights. Professor Amaryta Sen
has argued, for example, that a society that proclaims the urgency of basic
needs, has first to have a democratic framework so that the society can decide
what the basic needs are. He has also suggested that basic needs can probably
not be met in a society which is not responsive to public pressures or public
accountability. One might add that the transformative potential of human rights
(and that must be their role in many authoritarian and unequal societies in Asia)
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lies in the rights of association. speech and other trade union rights. One can
turn to history for guidance on sequencing. but that might be another device to
assert the priority of civil and political rights which may not be warranted in
contemporary times. Thesc issues arc also raised in discussions on democratization
as that implies a process. They are therefore best explored in the section on
governance below.
DEMOCRA TIZA TION AND GOVERNANCE
The context of this discussion is the growing constitutionalisation
of the
political orders of several Asian countries - for example, Thailand, Taiwan,
Pakistan, Cambodia, I3angiadesh. the Philippines, South I(orea, I-long Kong,
Mongolia and Nepal. The process is extraordinarily
complicated, for it involvcs
issues, which although they are often regarded as of a piece, have different
dynamics and conscquences - the dcvelopment of civil rights, the Rule of Law
and a liberal culture, dcmocratic reforms through the extension of the franchise
and other political rights. thc securing of economic and social rights, and fair
and transparcnt
governance
(to which in some instances
we should add
marketisation).
One prohlem is that in contemporary
constitutionalisation,
all
these goals are being sought simult'-1I1eously. In any circumstances
such a task
would be daunting, but it bccomes evcn more problematic bccause thcre may
well, at least in the short run. he a conflict between them. In the nineteenth
century, for example, the rulc of law was considered to be under threat from
democratization.
MallY countries in the transition to democracy ill this century
have built ill a deliberate "democracy dcficit", in part to placate its former
enemies but also to create the capacity to absorb the social and political
consequences
of democratization.
It could he argued ill historical terms that as
democracy was preceded by civil rights and the rule of law. it was acceptable
(because the economic and social rights of the bourgeoisie would be protected)
and feasible (because of the importance attached to valucs and procedures).
While democracy itself set the stage for economic amI social rights. The relevance
of this analysis in today's conditions may bc qucstioned, although a plausible
case can be made out that the fragility of dcmocracy ill many developing countries
is due to the lack of traditions of civillibertics and the rule of law.

that

Democratic theory does not provide clear answers to a number of issues
require an instrumental
solutio!) - does cconomic liberalisation
lead to

political freedoms or vice versa (the Hussia-China debate), is it more important to
concentrate on the strengthening of civil society or the reform of State structures,
can purely secular
the pre-conditions
human

organisation
of public power command legitimacy, what are
of democracy, what is the link betwecn marketisation
and

rights. and indeed thc connection

Let me. as an illustration

bctwecn diffcrent kinds of rights.

of thc difficulties,
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explore somc conflicts between

human rights and democracy. (I do not refer to the older debates as to whether
an entrenched bill of rights interpreted by non-clected judiciaries are compatible
with delnocracy
and whether
they weaken the political process by their
"legalisation" consequences,
for it seems to me that the political process might
be enriched rather than impoverished by rights in most developing countries
and that the executive and the legislature have frequently few claims to democratic
legitimacy). The formalisation and adjudication of rights have thrust courts and
tribunals at the centre of their definitions and enforcement and their discourse
has become increasingly specialised. This detracts both from the responsibility
and capacity of elected bodies for human rights. The globalisation
of human
rights detaches specific rights from the national context and relevance. The
transformative
consequences
of economic and social rights (e.g., the revolution
in the position of women or the shift of power from one caste to another in rural
Nepal) may be threatening
to an infant democracy because of the interests of
incumbent
leaders and influential groups. Marketisation
may threaten social
rights.
When there Lire conflicts, rights Lire likely to give in to democracy. Although
rights are now prescribed in considerable detail, and democracy is still nebulous
(no international instrument defines or protects it), democracy seems to command
greater legitimacy, at least in Asia. Rights are harder to enforce than democracy,
in part because of the differing precision of definitions. It may also threaten
existing power structures. For that reason democracy may be used to suppress
human rights. Democracy,
seen largely as an electoral
process, becomes
plebiscitary. Democracy, seen as the access to state power, becomes manipulative
and corrupting. Yet it is presented as the voice of the people, a talisman to ward
off domestic and foreign pressures for rights and equity. But for that very reason
it increasingly relies on, and caters to, sectional interests. In the South Asian
context, ethnicity has frequently provided that sectional interest. Ethnicity, linked
to the democratic or at least the electoral process, has had, for the most part
negative effect on governance and human rights. Political parties have aggregated
and articulated ethnic demands, the majority community has imposed its cultural
forms on the state, and the rights of minorities have been trampled upon. The
result has often been the militarisation of both the state and civil society and the
application of oppressive legislation which has denied a whole array of political,
civil, economic and social rights. And yet democracy of a sort has flourished and
fed the process of the attrition of democratic values.
Time has come to forge and strengthen

links between

democracy

rights. Democracy,
in all its dimensions,
not merely electoral,
rehabilitated.
The values of democracy provide the link to human

and

has to be
rights. The

strengthening
of human rights would then mean strengthening
democracy. But
democracy, to validate and legitimise human rights, has to respond to the
cultural and moral impulses of the society. Western forms of democracy (by
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which I mean the forms of former metropolitan powers) have not been appropriate
for Asia (any more than for Africa). This may seem a route back to relativism.
But it is the relativism of forms, not substance, and may be necessary for some
sort of regime of universal values underpinning the dignity of women and men.
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